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CORPORATIONS-APPRAISAL STATUTES-EXCLUSIVENESS OF STATUTORY

REM-

EDY-Defendant corporation's charter provided for retirement 'of preferred stock
at par plus accumulated dividends, before payment could be made to common
stockholders, in the event of dissolution or "recapture" of its assets by the enfranchising city. Under authority of a majority vote of its stockholders, the corporation
conveyed all its assets to defend;mt City of Quincy, the enfranchising city. Defendants offered to pay preferred stockholders only $150 per share, although
par plus accumulated d_ividends ~mounted to $205 and some common stockholders had already received $5 per share. Plaintiffs, preferred stockholders,
sued to secure full payment, but-the trial court held that their on_ly remedy was
assertion of the statutory right to appraisal and payment. 1 On appeal, held,
reversed. The statutory remedy is not exclusive when the distribution agreement is in fraud of stockholders' rights. Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co.,
(Ill. App. 1948) 82 N.E. (2d) 184.
Absent an express statutory mandate to the contrary, 2 courts have usually

Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 32, §157.73.
The appraisal remedy has been made exclusive by statute in four jurisdictions, although
only Michigan extends the remedy to cover a sale of total assets. Cal. Corp. Code (Deering,
1948) §4123; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§450.44, 450.54; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1948)
tit. 15, §2852-908; Rev. Laws of Hawaii (1945) §8387. Several jurisdictions provide in terms
that the dissenter is concluded by the vote of assenting stockholders if he fails to commence
1

2

1949]

RECENT DECISIONS

IOll

reached the result of the principal case.3 When statutes were enacted permitting
fundamental alterations in the purposes and powers of a corporation by less
than a unanimous. vote of stockholders, the minority stockholder was necessarily deprived of his common law right to prevent such alterations.4 Appraisal
provisions find their origin in a theory of compensation for this deprivation.
These two types of statutes together form a legislative attempt to balance the
necessity of adjusting corporate mechanisms to business exigencies against the
injustice to the minority stockholder of compelling him to suffer changes in
his investment against his .wishes.5 Thus, the usual approach of the courts has
been that appraisal statutes are designed to give the dissenting stockholder relief
against a legal but personally unfavorable act of the majority. The cases reiterate
that common law remedies are still available to prevent action by the corporation
in excess of the statutory authority, 6 and that the appraisal remedy will not
be held exclusive where there is showing of fraud 7 or oppressive and inequitable
treatment of the minority. 8 One argument against this view is that the corporation may thereby be forced to cope with a multiplicity of suits in different forums
prosecuted on different theories, with the resultant possibility of varying recoveries for identical interests.0 Other arguments .,are based on the continuing possibility of extortion through strike suits and the difficulty of rescinding a completed transaction of the type and magnitude usually involved.10 However, the
consensus of judicial opinion seems to be that the general statutory purpose
proceedings under the statutes; e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 32, §157.73; Ohio
Code (Throckmorton, 1948) §8623-72, but these have been construed to leave open the
possibility of attack for fraud and illegality, or possibly to make such action a condition
precedent to commencement of any type of suit. Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61
0. App. 1, 22 N.E. (2d) 281 (1939); Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 0. St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d)
127 (1938); Morris v. Columbia Apartments Corp., 323 Ill. App. 292, 55 N.E. (2d) 401
(1944). Only Washington expressly provides for preservation of the equitable remedy for
fraud. Wash. (Rem.) Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) §3803-36.
3 13 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §5893 (1943).
4 Mayfield v. Alton Ry., Gas & Blee. Co., 198 Ill. 528, 65 N.E. 100 (1902).
5Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934); In re Timmis, 200
N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910).
6 Wheatley v. Root Co., 147 0. St. 127, 69 N.E. (2d) 187 (1946); Starret Corp. v. 5th
Ave. & 29th St. Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 868; Genl. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore &
M.S. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1918) 250 F. 160 at 174.
7 Cole v. Natl. Cash Credit Assn., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931); Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., (D.C. Mont. 1914) 216 F. 242; Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,
(Del. Ch. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 148 (actual or constructive fraud).
8 Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928), affd. 104
N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929); MacArthur v. Port of Havana Docks Co., (D.C. Me. 1917)
247 F. 984. But see Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Co., (D.C. Del. 1942) 45 F. Supp.
436, holding that relief may be afforded only if the plan is so unfair as to shock the conscience
and amount to actual fraud.
9 See Adams v. United States Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134 at 146, 34 S.E. (2d)
244 (1945), where the court regarded it as "inconceivable ... that the legislature ever intended that dissenting stockholders ... should receive different values for their shares."
10 Ballantine & Sterling, "Upsetting Mergers and Consolidations: Alternative Remedies
of Dissenting Shareholders in California," 27 CALIF. L. REv. 644 (1939). But to the effect
that danger of strike suits has been overemphasized, see Lattin, "A Reappraisal of Appraisal
Statutes,'' 38 MicH. L. REv. 1165 (1940).
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is not to divest dissenters of protection against illegal action; the statutes contemplate proceedings carried through in good faith, not tainted with fraud. 11
Statutes limiting the dissenter to the single alternative of selling out would, if
literally enforced, 12 increase the chances of success of a majority attempt to
"squeeze out" minorities by changes making their stock virtually worthless. 13
The importance of such an alteration in the protection of legal rights makes it
doubtful that the legislature intended this result to be implied from the creation
of a new remedy.

William R. Worth

11 Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928); Johnson v.
Lamprecht, 133 0. St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938).
12 It might be doubted that any court would permit perversion of the statute into a shield
for obviously fraudulent actions. See Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., (D.C. Pa.
1941) 42 F. Supp. 432, where the court, in denying injunctive relief, emphasized the fairness
and legality of the proposed merger, although the statutory remedy was exclusive.
13 Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 72, 67 A. 657 at 668 (1907);
S.E.C., Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part VII, pp. 609-610 (1938).

